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 1 
Phenomenology and the Perceptual Model of Emotion 
Peter Poellner 
 
1. The perceptual model and its motivations 
 
In the last decade or so there has been a revival of an account of occurrent conscious 
emotions as analogous in important ways to perceptual experiences, or even as 
being such experiences. According to this view, emotional experiences in favourable 
circumstances disclose value properties to the subjects of those experiences, 
properties that are, in the basic cases, typically instantiated in the subjects’ 
environment.1 Usually, the properties in question are taken to be determinate, 
‘thick’ evaluative properties. The thought is that, in an episode of indignation about 
an unjust action that I am witnessing, I may have or acquire a perceptual 
acquaintance with the action’s injustice, in fear I may have a perceptual experience 
of an object’s or event’s fearsomeness, in aesthetic admiration I can become 
acquainted with an object’s determinate beauty, and so forth.  
If one is sympathetic to this construal of the basic cases of emotional 
experience, that is, those cases in which the particular target of the emotion is itself 
directly presented to the subject, it is tempting to modify it slightly for other cases, 
in which the target is represented indirectly, for example in verbally entertained 
belief, or imagistic memory, or expectation. The modification might go roughly as 
follows: when I feel moved by the beauty of a piece of music that I recall, or when I 
fear an anticipated danger, these affective experiences involve indirect intuitive 
representations of the relevant evaluative properties, representations that are 
parasitic on direct perceptual acquaintance. In fearing an impending battle, the 
soldier imagines ‘from the inside’ a direct encounter with the target of his fear, in 
feeling moved by the recalled piece of music I imagine relevant evaluative properties 
of the music as these would show up in direct auditory experience. In both cases, the 
claim is, the evaluative properties – determinates of fearsomeness and beauty, 
                                                        
1 Supporters of perceptual accounts of at least some emotional or affective 
experiences include Johnston (2001), Goldie (2007), Tappolet (2011, 2012), and 
Pelser (2014).   
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respectively – would need to be intuitively represented via images or analoga taken 
as resembling evaluative features of the intentional targets (the enemy assault or 
the musical performance). If it is right to say that to imagine in this way is to imagine 
directly experiencing the target, these cases may then be thought to be parasitic on 
the more basic perceptual case. I shall call the latter, where the target object or 
event is presented directly, basic-case emotional experience, and the cases in which 
the target is represented indirectly derivative. 2 
But why should one be tempted by this sort of perception-based model of 
emotional experience at all? Most contemporary advocates of the model appeal to 
phenomenological considerations about what it is like to undergo emotional 
experiences, drawing attention to apparent close similarities between emotional 
experiences and paradigmatic perceptual experiences such as sense perceptions: (i) 
Both sense perceptions and emotions have intentional objects. (ii) Both sense 
perceptions and basic case emotions seem to involve a direct access to distinctive 
phenomenal characteristics of those objects. In the sense- perceptual case these 
might include an object’s shape, colour, or movement; in the emotional case (on the 
mainstream perceptualist view) the properties accessed essentially include ‘thick’ 
evaluative properties such as injustice, cruelty, fearsomeness, beauty, and so forth. 
Both types of experience thus involve distinctive phenomenal properties that 
present themselves as properties of the object. (iii) Sense perceptions and basic-case 
emotions are partly, albeit not exclusively, passive or receptive experiences. (iv) 
Finally, both, while being intentional, seem to differ from judgements or beliefs in 
similar ways: just as a subject in visual illusion can have a sense-perceptual 
experience of something as being thus-and-so,3 and simultaneously believe that it is 
not thus-and-so without thereby having contradictory beliefs, so there can be 
                                                        
2 Contemporary perceptualists usually say little about the derivative cases. It is 
clear that the intuitive representation of value features of the target in 
imagination cannot be sufficient to explain the character of most, if any, of these 
emotions; one does not feel real grief about a merely imagined loss. Is it even 
necessary? For some thoughts on this on behalf of a qualified perceptualist view, 
see note 19 below. 
3 ‘Perceptual experience’ is here and throughout used in a non-factive sense, 
applying also to perceptual illusions. If one finds this objectionable one may 
replace it by ‘perceptual or quasi-perceptual experience’ or some such 
paraphrase. 
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‘recalcitrant emotions’ such as phobic experiences in which a subject affectively 
continues to experience a situation or object as terrifying while simultaneously and 
with full conviction judging it to be harmless, without thereby evincing contradictory 
beliefs.4 
 
A qualified version of the perceptual model was canvassed in the early 20th century 
by the classical phenomenologists, most explicitly by Scheler and Sartre.5 It was 
qualified in the sense that their view was not that all emotions are perceptual 
experiences as of specific values, or derivatives of such experiences, but rather that 
intelligible emotions – emotions that make sense to the subject – are experiential 
encounters with value properties as such properties, and that some emotion types 
involve perceptual experiences, or derivative intuitive experiences, as of value 
properties in ‘objects’. (‘Objects’ in the broad sense deployed by the 
phenomenologists include physical particulars, persons, 6  their properties, as well as 
                                                        
4 The analogy with perceptual illusion is challenged by Helm (2001: 42f., 2015). 
For a persuasive defence, see Doering (2015). 
5 The inclusion of Sartre among the advocates of a perceptual account of some 
emotions may seem surprising. Sartre is usually taken to hold a view of emotions 
as entirely non-receptive purposeful mental acts in which a subject attempts to 
misrepresent the world in situations of difficulty – a kind of autosuggestion. This 
reading is based exclusively on his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. But even 
in that text he recognizes another ‘main type’ of emotion that is not purposefully 
distorting in this way but whose evaluative content is supplied ‘by the object 
itself’ (Sartre 2002b: 57-8). Some emotions therefore are ‘ways of discovering 
the world’ (2002a: 383-4). This second type of emotion is fundamental to 
Sartre’s account of our access to value, but Sartre never develops it in detail, 
sometimes simply referring to Scheler’s authority in this context (Sartre 1999: 
88; 2004a: 68-9; cf. 2003: 62, 624-5). There are important differences between 
Scheler’s and Sartre’s positions. For Sartre, the affective perceptual disclosure of 
value in the world essentially depends on the subject having a transformative 
project whose end, while conscious, need not be in its entirety explicitly 
(conceptually) represented by the subject at the time. Sartre holds, further, that 
the experienced positive value of any contingent object or ensemble of objects is 
necessarily given as relative (‘surpassable’), i.e. as trumped by values that cannot 
be had by contingent objects. For present purposes I shall ignore these aspects of 
his view since they have no bearing on the central issues of this paper.  
6 ‘Persons’ is here used in the everyday sense, referring to individuals to whom 
both physical and mental predicates apply. By the phenomenologists’ lights, this 
does not capture what a person (a for-itself, in Sartre’s language) most 
fundamentally is. This claim need not concern us here.  
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events or states of affairs involving such entities.) This qualified version of the 
perceptual model – the Scheler-Sartre view as I shall call it – seems to me to have 
better prospects than a global perceptualist account. In the remainder of this 
Section, I shall reconstruct its motivations. Many of the current criticisms of the 
perceptual model seek to show that the model does not apply to any emotions at all. 
If they go through they obviously also invalidate the Scheler-Sartre view. In the 
subsequent Sections of this paper I shall assess some of these objections. 
The considerations which Scheler and Sartre take to favour a qualified 
perceptualist account start from reflections about what is involved in grasp of the 
everyday concepts of value and of specific values. They claim that these value 
concepts are not fundamentally theoretical concepts but are experientially 
grounded. What they refer to can be encountered in experience. Moreover, an 
unprejudiced description of what it is to experientially encounter value or disvalue 
needs to acknowledge that, in very many cases, we experience these as properties 
qualifying particular objects. We experience such things as paintings, buildings, 
musical performances, or the actions of other people as being valuable or 
disvaluable in determinate ways, and this is not just a matter of what 
phenomenologists call ‘empty’ (i.e. symbolically mediated) judgement distinct from 
what seems manifest in the experience itself. Scheler and Sartre contend that what 
is experienced here is not adequately described as a feature of a strictly subjective, 
qualia-like aspect of the experience that might be characterized without adverting to 
apparent objectual properties. It is the music itself that strikes me as grand, the 
other person’s comportment itself that seems graceful, the colleague’s reply itself 
that strikes me as mean-spirited.  
When we try to grasp the nature of this kind of experience more precisely, we find 
that it typically includes a valenced (positive or negative) affective component, a felt 
approval or disapproval. For the phenomenologists, understanding this aspect of 
evaluative experience is key to understanding the phenomenon of value. Their 
descriptions of it are suggestive but not as clear as they might be. Scheler says: 
 
Values as values … are experienced as efficacious or motivating …. They 
‘attract’ or ‘repel’, and this doesn’t just mean, as it might easily be 
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misconstrued: we desire or abhor them, but merely in an urge-like 
(triebhafte) manner … There is a clear difference between … ‘I am hungry’ or 
‘I am desirous of…’ on the one hand and that attraction or repulsion which is 
experienced as coming from the valuable things themselves, and not, like 
those occurrences, as pertaining to myself. (Scheler 1980/1973: 253/247; cf. 
Sartre 2004b: 20).7 
 
Scheler’s talk here of experienced values being ‘efficacious or motivating’ doesn’t 
fully get to the heart of the matter, since it says nothing about the justificatory or 
reason-giving dimension of value. Elsewhere he adds in clarification: 
 
It lies in the essence of … values as objects that are distinct from the 
occurrences in which they are grasped that they demand acknowledgment 
(Scheler 1980/1973: 185/176; my italics). 
 
These points are then taken up by Sartre in his dicta that ‘values in actuality are 
demands’ (Sartre 2003: 62), that ‘by their nature they “ought to be”’ (Sartre 1999: 
88). 
The idea gestured at in these passages seems to be this. Experiencing 
something transparently as a value requires experiencing it as making a ‘demand’ of 
some sort. What kind of demand is this supposed to be? Sartre has it that the value 
essentially demands ‘to be’, that is, to be or to remain actualized, if it is a positive 
value; and presumably not to be or to remain actualized if it is a negative value. In 
fact, the talk of ‘demand’ here is slightly misleading: grasping something as a 
demand is not the same as grasping that demand to be justified. But presumably 
when I experience something as a value, and I take that experience at face value, I 
do take its ‘demand’, whatever it is, to be justified. Scheler (and occasionally also 
Sartre – see citation above) therefore speaks more helpfully of an ‘ideal ought-to-be’ 
(ideales Seinsollen) attaching essentially to positive value properties, and 
                                                        
7 Translations from Scheler’s Formalism in Ethics are my own. References to the 
English edition, which is not always reliable, are given after page references to 
the standard German edition.  
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distinguishes this kind of ‘ought’ from the ‘normative ought’ or ought-to-do 
(Tunsollen, Scheler 1980/1973: 225f./218f.) that can be expressed as an imperative. 
What the terminology of an ideal ought-to-be seeks to capture is the familiar 
intuition that to acknowledge something to be of positive value is to acknowledge 
that it pro tanto merits or deserves to be or to remain actualized, while to 
acknowledge something to be of negative value is to acknowledge that it pro tanto 
merits not to be (or to remain) realized.  
Now if one accepts this, and if one is also sympathetic to the 
phenomenologists’ initial claim that values can be experientially encountered as 
such, this commits one to the conclusion that, in the case of positive values, they 
would have to be experienced as involving, or co-constituted by, the property of 
meriting-to-be-actual (or to remain so). What would such an experience be? It is this 
question that Scheler seeks to answer when he says that ‘values as values … are 
experienced as efficacious or motivating … they “attract” or “repel”’, and that the 
kind of ‘attraction’ or ‘repulsion’ at issue here is not simply urge-like but experienced 
as intelligibly motivated by features of the object itself. We might perhaps call the 
experiences he has in mind felt approval or felt disapproval of an actual or possible 
‘object’ existing or continuing to exist in so far as it possesses the relevant (dis)value. 
The felt approval or disapproval here, Scheler wants to say, is not a reaction to 
another, putatively non-valenced kind of experiential access to those values; rather, 
it presents itself as an uptake of the value’s pro tanto justified ‘demand’ to be or 
remain actual (if it is a positive value). And it is that property of meriting-to-be-actual 
that partly constitutes a positive evaluative property as such. It is (partly) what that 
evaluative property is. Hence there could not be a non-valenced transparent 
experience of it, one that did not essentially involve such felt favour or disfavour. 
If the experience of something as positively valuable involves something like 
a felt approval (felt favouring, ‘attraction’), it is plausible to think that this experience 
is inherently such as to motivate other mental states, actions or inclinations to act 
with respect to that thing in suitable circumstances. My experience, whether direct 
or imaginatively indirect, of a particular painting as having a specific kind of aesthetic 
worth will, if taken at face value, motivate an inclination to contemplate or explore 
it, or inclinations to protect it if I believe its existence to be threatened (say, by a 
 7 
bombing raid in a war situation) and if I also believe that I am in a position to prevent 
its destruction; and it will motivate anger or sadness when I learn that it has actually 
been destroyed.   
Such motivating powers, Scheler holds, are essential to the experience of 
value as value in relevant contexts, and this seems plausible if that experience is or 
includes a felt, as opposed to ‘emptily’ judged, acknowledgement of the value 
meriting to be actual. As Scheler puts it: ‘the felt knowledge determines my will 
immediately without the need for an intervening “I ought”’ (Scheler 1980/1973: 
217/210). His idea here is that the relevant experience, if taken at face value, and 
given appropriate background beliefs, essentially includes action inclinations by 
virtue of its intuitively presented evaluative content. Unlike a mere (‘empty’) 
evaluative judgement, it cannot be motivationally inert (given suitable background 
beliefs); nor does it require a reflective acknowledgement of deontic reasons to 
acquire motivational force.8 
If we now ask what sort of experiences satisfy these requirements – 
presenting themselves as disclosures of values as values in objects, being valenced 
and inherently such as to motivate action inclinations in suitable circumstances – it 
seems that many conscious emotions are just the sort of experiences that fit the bill. 
Scheler therefore speaks of these sorts of emotional experiences as ‘feeling- 
intuitions’ (i.e. emotional perceptions or perception-derivative imaginings; Scheler 
1980: 270/265).9 And Sartre says that it is ‘my indignation [that] has given to me the 
                                                        
8 Nor, Scheler thinks, is such a reflective acknowledgement of deontic reasons 
required for the action motivated by the experience to be potentially justified. 
9 Mulligan (2012) interprets Scheler as claiming that emotions are reactions to 
values that are experientially presented in a prior, non-emotional kind of ‘value-
feeling’ (Wertfühlen), which is always non-valenced. This is a misinterpretation, 
explicable by some obscurities and inconsistencies in Scheler’s terminology, 
particularly between the first part of Formalism (1913) – which in some places 
might seem to support Mulligan’s reading – and the second part (1916). In the 
latter, Scheler explicitly holds that there are four classes of Gefühle, including 
emotions (Scheler 1980/1973: 331f./328f.), and these correspond to his four 
generic classes of values (Scheler 1980/1973: 122f./104f.). There is no mention 
of an additional kind of non-valenced, sui generis value-feeling. The distinction he 
is concerned to draw in Part 1 of Formalism is not between intentional emotions 
and supposedly sui generis value-feelings, but between non-intentional bodily 
feeling states (Gefühlszustände; Scheler 1980: 119, 262-3) and intentional 
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negative value “baseness”, my admiration [that] has presented the positive value 
“grandeur”’ (Sartre 2003:62). In these cases of emotional experience, evaluative 
features are given as attaching to ‘the object itself’ (Sartre 2002b: 57), hence the 
‘meaning of the emotion [here comes] from the world and not from ourselves’ (ibid.: 
58): ‘An unpleasantness on the unreflective level transcends itself in the same 
manner as an unreflective consciousness of pity. It is the intuitive grasping of a 
disagreeable quality of an object’. (Sartre 2004b: 18; trans. modified). 
 
The Scheler-Sartre view as outlined so far obviously leaves many questions 
unanswered. It also seems to be vulnerable to many of the recent criticisms of 
perceptual accounts of emotion. The main worries that bear on this version of the 
model can perhaps be grouped into four clusters. First, it has been charged with 
misdescribing even the kinds of emotional experience that are taken to be central by 
its advocates. Second, it is objected that there are phenomenological disanalogies 
between emotions and standard perceptual experiences that fatally undermine the 
model. Third, it has been argued that there are fundamental differences in the 
rationalizing properties of standard perceptions and emotions. Fourth, there seems 
to be something just fundamentally mysterious about the very idea of evaluative 
properties had by objects, and of these being directly accessible as such in emotional 
experience. 
 
2.  Does the qualified perceptual model misdescribe emotional experience? 
 
The Scheler-Sartre view contends that many conscious emotions involve an intuitive 
consciousness of objects (events, etc.) as having various determinate evaluative 
properties. Their manifest content is partly evaluative and their evaluative content 
serves to individuate the emotion as the type of emotion it is. (I am using ‘content’ 
here and throughout in the minimal Husserlian sense – the object presented as it is 
                                                                                                                                                              
feelings. In his later The Nature of Sympathy (1923), he again states that values 
are the noematic correlates (contents) of intentional feelings and here too he 
recognizes no additional kind of putatively non-valenced value-feeling: 
‘emotional act-forms … have an essential reference to particular kinds of value as 
their noematic correlates’ (Scheler 2009: 169). 
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presented – without further theoretical commitments to, for example, the claim that 
the content has the structure of a proposition).  
This idea is often challenged by critics of the perceptual model. Deonna and 
Teroni (2012, 2015) insist that there is no ‘perception-like phenomenology of danger 
[fearsomeness]’ (2015: 308), and that the content of emotions, supplied by their 
cognitive base (a judgement, memory, sense perception, etc.) can be adequately 
characterized in terms of non-evaluative properties: ‘evaluative properties … do not 
figure in the content of the emotions’ (2012: 84). Hence evaluative properties that 
may be possessed by the target of the emotion do not individuate emotions about 
the target.  
Dokic and Lemaire argue that ‘it is hard to understand … how … qualitative 
feelings could present something evaluative. In general, we have no idea of 
qualitative experiences presenting evaluative properties’ (Dokic and Lemaire 2013: 
235). They grant that conscious emotions may sometimes seem to do so, but this 
misleading appearance is a result of what they call informational enrichment. It is 
like seeming to see that a cooking plate is hot by seeing it reddening. I can be 
immediately, non-inferentially aware of the cooking plate as hot, but its heat is not 
literally (‘openly and transparently’; 2013: 228) presented in or through the visual 
experience, although it may seem to me that way because my cognitive state has 
been enriched by information supplied by other states external to it; here, by my 
background knowledge about correlations between reddening cooking plates and 
heat. Just so when an observed action’s cruelty seems to me to be presented in my 
experience of indignation about the action. 
 
Let me take these objections in turn.  
(a) Is the content of emotional experience non-evaluative? This would entail that 
when, say, I feel aesthetically moved by a Mozart piano concerto I am listening to, 
the target of my emotion as it is experienced in the emotion is presented entirely in 
terms of those non-evaluative features – chord successions, harmonic and melodic 
patterns, tempi, and so forth – on which the music’s aesthetic value, in this instance, 
supervenes. The Schelerian response is that I can have a very distinct sense of what 
it is about the music that my aesthetic emotion, my being moved, appears to 
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respond to without having any distinct grasp of those subtending non-evaluative 
features (Scheler 1980/1973: 40/17, 203/195). So my emotional experience cannot 
present itself to me as a response to those non-evaluative features; rather it appears 
to me to be a response to something I may be inclined to describe as a harmoniously 
balanced yet dynamic grace, or some such –something that is adequately 
characterized only in evaluative terms.  
Take another example. In conversation at a party I am affectively ‘put off’ by 
what I am inclined to describe as my interlocutor’s deviously insincere behaviour. 
Again, it may be perfectly obvious to me that that is what my experience is picking 
up without my being able to pinpoint the non-evaluative features of his expressive 
behaviour on which the apparent devious insincerity supervenes. No doubt there are 
such features. Psychologists tell us that posed, ‘fake’ facial expressions have typical 
features distinguishing them from spontaneous expressions (more abrupt onset and 
end, greater asymmetry, different patterns of activation of facial muscles, etc.).10 
And no doubt there are also such non-evaluative features subtending my 
apprehension of the expressive behaviour as devious. But none of these features 
may be identifiable by me when I respond to it with negative emotion, nor in 
subsequent reflection on the experience; therefore it is difficult to see how they 
could be what my emotion presents itself as a response to. This strongly supports 
the idea, shared by the Scheler-Sartre view and contemporary perceptualists, that 
the phenomenology cannot be captured without the use of evaluative terms in 
describing its manifest content. 
 (b) Dokic and Lemaire (2013) agree with the Scheler-Sartre view that the 
content of many emotions seems at least partly evaluative – that it immediately, 
non-inferentially, strikes the subject that way. But they contend that this is a result 
of ‘cognitive enrichment’. The apparent evaluative content ‘does not come from the 
experience itself, but has been brought in by background beliefs or cognitive habits’ 
(Dokic and Lemaire 2013: 232). There are different ways of interpreting this 
suggestion. One reading is that the experience has as its enabling conditions the 
occurrence of other mental states, such as judgements, with that content, and 
                                                        
10 Ekman, Hager and Friesen (1981: 101-6). 
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perhaps also other experiences with a relevantly similar (but, e.g., non-
conceptualized) content. If that is the suggestion it should not trouble the 
perceptualist, for the same is true of many bona fide perceptual contents. I can see a 
certain item to be a washing machine, and I can hear a string of sounds coming from 
someone’s mouth as a sentence having a certain meaning. Given appropriate prior 
knowledge and instruction, my experience itself can come to present an item as a 
washing machine or a string of noises as meaningful in a certain way. Or at least it’s 
natural to think that experiences can acquire such rich contents. This is in fact a key 
idea in Husserlian phenomenology: the contents of earlier experiences and 
judgements can become ‘sedimented’ in later experiences and in this sense enrich 
the latter’s content. 
Dokic and Lemaire’s illustration of the reddening cooking plate ‘seen’ to be 
hot suggests that they may have a different point in mind. It’s plausible to suppose 
that the content hot here is supplied not by the experience but by another 
component of the subject’s total state of mind at the time, most likely a judgement. 
Might something similar be said for the apparent evaluative content of emotional 
experience?  
The phenomenon of recalcitrant emotion suggests that this hypothesis is 
mistaken. In recalcitrant emotion I consciously and confidently judge that the target 
object does not have the evaluative property my emotion presents it a having (which 
is what invites the analogy with sense-perceptual illusion). I may have come to the 
settled view that physical accomplishments are utterly worthless, and yet, when 
witnessing a gymnastics competition I may be struck with admiration for the 
gymnasts’ feats as quite terrific.  
The objector may take the heroic line here and argue that in recalcitrant 
emotion there must be an unconscious belief contradicting one’s consciously held 
judgement. But whether this line holds out any promise in explaining cases of 
emotional recalcitrance more generally, it won’t help in the present context. What 
we are trying to explain is how my emotional experience can appear to me to be 
value-presenting. We are trying to account for the phenomenal difference between 
an emotion and mental states that quite evidently lack evaluative content, such as 
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disinterestedly watching the rain outside. This phenomenal difference cannot be 
explained by a content or act that is phenomenally unconscious.11   
 
3. Do phenomenological differences between emotions and standard perceptions 
undermine the Scheler-Sartre view? 
 
The second cluster of objections I want to consider turns on alleged essential 
phenomenological differences between uncontroversial cases of perception (such as 
visual perception) and basic-case emotions.  
First, it is widely held that perceptual experiences are transparent. When we 
try to characterize the phenomenal character, the what-it-is-likeness of, say, the 
visual experience of a particular scene, we need to mention properties of the 
perceived scene. On a strong version of the thesis, there is nothing beyond 
properties of the latter, seen from a particular point view and under specific 
environmental conditions, that goes to make up the phenomenal character of the 
visual experience. On a weaker version, at least the core of the phenomenology is 
constituted by properties of the scene perceived. This seems quite different from the 
phenomenology of emotions: 
 
the felt quality of fear is not clearly experienced by us as a feature of the 
spider that frightens us …. If you are to describe how it feels to be frightened 
by a spider, you would not do so in terms of the spider’s qualities, but rather 
in terms of how it feels to experience … muscles freezing, heart jumping, etc. 
(Deonna and Teroni 2012: 69) 
 
In order to assess this point, we should recall that the Scheler-Sartre view is not 
committed to the claim that all basic-case emotions only or primarily present 
apparent value-features of their objectual targets. Many emotion types – standard 
                                                        
11 Might the phenomenal difference be explained by other components of the 
subject’s overall mental state, such as bodily feels? As Dokic and Lemaire 
themselves observe when discussing the attitudinal theory, it is unclear how 
such experiential components could even seem to us to present an external 
object as having some value or other (Dokic and Lemaire 2015: 280). 
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fear being a case in point – have self-referential components in the sense that they 
include an awareness of the subject of the experience under an evaluative aspect. 
(Think, for another example, of conscious envy, which involves such an awareness of 
oneself as lacking something one values.) In fear one typically is aware of oneself as 
something one values and as being endangered. The somatic processes mentioned 
by Deonna and Teroni reflect this awareness and it is plausible to think that they are 
normally caused by it. If the relevant self-awareness is not itself perceptual, then 
these emotions are unhelpful examples to illustrate the perceptual thesis and it is 
unfortunate that they figure so prominently in discussions of it. 
If any emotions are plausibly construed on the perceptual model, they would 
have to be emotions that are not obviously self-referential in this way. Consider the 
kind of examples favoured by Scheler: 
 
I am awed by the grandeur of a natural scenery. 
I am indignant about a malicious remark about another person that I overhear. 
I admire the justice of an action I witness. 
I feel pity for a person in severe mental distress. 
 
What these cases have in common is that the emotions here (i) typically do not 
include a self-referential component in the above sense, and that (ii) they are what 
Scheler calls ‘psychic’ (seelische) emotions, mental states which a subject can 
experience without undergoing any distinctive somatic feelings or other bodily 
responses (Scheler 1980/1973: 344/342; cf. Stein 1980: 55).12 They may be 
associated with a bodily phenomenology, as when I feel ready to upbraid the person 
making the malicious remark, or poised to take action to alleviate the sufferer’s 
distress. But they need not be. I may believe that I am quite incapable of helping the 
                                                        
12 This is one of the places where the translation (Scheler 1973: 342) gets 
Scheler’s point seriously wrong. What he says is that ‘a person whose psychic 
feelings were not “motivated” (in the sense of the intelligible connections 
mentioned earlier), and the continuity of whose [psychic] feelings was constantly 
disrupted by any changing emotion-accompanying bodily states, would be just as 
unintelligible as someone who is intellectually severely disturbed’ (Scheler 1980: 
344).   
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distressed person, and this belief may penetrate my experience in such a way that I 
feel no inclination to intervene. It’s just implausible to say that in that case my 
experience could no longer be one of pity. In other cases, such as the first example 
above, it’s not even clear what a relevant bodily response or action inclination might 
be (Scheler 1980/1973: 183/173). There may be somatic accompaniments as when I 
feel my body opening up or relaxing, but it is hard to believe that I could not 
experience awe without something like these feelings, and even harder to accept 
that they can serve to distinguish an experience of awe from one of, say relaxed 
curiosity. And even when I do have such bodily feelings, they seem to be effects of 
other components of the emotional experience, in particular of the way the objects 
is experienced anyway, without the putative contribution of those feelings. 
But aren’t even these sorts of emotions opaque in a way that sense 
perceptions are not, their value-bearing components being not features of the 
object but distinctly ‘subjective’, non-intentional qualia, supposedly inner but non-
somatic feelings of pleasure, displeasure or the like? Scheler explicitly considers this 
objection and rejects it:  
 
the value quality is not a [non-intentional] feeling state or a relation to some 
such state …., just as the quality ‘blue’ [when looking at a blue object] is not a 
visual sensation or a relation to some such sensation-state (Scheler 
1980/1973: 249/243). 
 
His point is that when we try to adequately characterize the value component of the 
kinds of emotions we are considering, we cannot do so without adverting to 
apparent value features of the object, just as when we try to characterize a putative 
sense perception as of a blue flower we cannot do so without reference to a colour 
property the object appears as having. When we admire the landscape, we do not 
experience a neutrally presented landscape plus some positive quasi-sensational or 
adverbial quale. There is no such quale in the experience, one that we might then 
mistake for a quality of the object when we judge, on the basis of the experience, 
‘this landscape is sublime’ (cf. Scheler 1980/1973: 182/172-3). Nor is the affective 
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attitudinal component of the experience, the felt approval or disapproval, given as 
the bearer of the value, although it is experienced as registering that value. 
Granting this for the moment, there is still a crucial difference between these 
sorts of emotions and ordinary perceptions, and this might be thought to vindicate 
the transparency objection after all. Like other emotions, those ‘psychic’ emotions 
are valenced; they involve what Scheler calls ‘attraction’ or repulsion’, which I have 
paraphrased as felt approval or disapproval. But these are clearly attitudes. In so far 
they are part of the phenomenal character of the emotion, that character therefore 
includes components that are not properties of the emotional target. Even if one 
rejects a strong transparency account of sense perception and holds that the 
phenomenal character of sense-perceptual experience also includes attitudes (such 
as expectations), there remains an important contrast: standard perceptions do not 
include valenced attitudes.  
The response available to the advocate of the Scheler-Sartre view is that this 
difference does not show that emotions cannot be perceptions; rather it is due to 
the distinctive nature of their content and the manner of access to it, viz. to the fact 
that emotional content involves value properties experientially given as such.13 
Recall that for something to be a positive value property is for it to merit, pro tanto, 
to be or to remain realized. An experiential encounter with that property as such 
would therefore require an experiential registering of that aspect of it. It would need 
to present itself as an uptake of the value’s ‘merit’, its justified ‘demand’ which 
makes it a positive value in the first place. Scheler’s contention is that this is just 
what the valenced attitudinal component of the emotional experience in, for 
example, admiration presents itself as.14 
But can such an attitudinal response to an object present itself in this way as 
appropriate in the sense of: serving to disclose a value property of the object, rather 
than merely as caused or motivated by something in the object (cf. Dokic and 
                                                        
13 The evaluative nature of the content also explains why affectively presented 
contents, unlike sense-perceptual contents, typically capture attention (cf. Brady 
2013: 90f.): their content is given as mattering.  
14 This explains what is right about the observation that emotions violate the 
attitude/content distinction: ‘their force (attitude) is an indissoluble aspect of 
their content’ (Gunther 2004: 43). 
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Lemaire 2013: 236-7)? As often with disputed phenomenological claims, a contrast 
may help to sharpen intuitions. Compare your indignation about the malicious 
remark you overheard with a case of aggressive envy, where you dislike someone 
merely for having some good you lack; or the case where you have been irritable all 
day due to some unpleasant news and in the evening you snap in anger at an 
innocent remark made by your partner. In the last two cases, unlike in the first case, 
it seems right to say that your affective state presents itself merely as motivated by 
some property of the target object, but not as an appropriate response to it. And 
you can recognize this phenomenal difference on the basis of an awareness of 
differences in the experiences themselves and their respective contents. 
 
Deonna and Teroni highlight a further putative phenomenological contrast between 
standard perceptions and the ‘psychic’ emotions focused on by Scheler: 
 
[Emotions] differ from perceptions in that they cannot be seen as 
independent ways of accessing the objects that exemplify these properties. 
For instance, while the injustice of Jonas’s remark is perceived by Mary 
through her indignation, the remark itself is not. … [S]he hears the remark 
and feels  it is unjust. The evaluative apprehension … is grounded in such 
non-evaluative bases: … [T]here is no such comparable distinction between 
two psychological levels … within the field of perception proper. (Deonna and 
Teroni 2012: 69).  
 
It’s fairly uncontroversial that values are higher-order properties. It makes no sense 
to think of a remark as being just malicious without it having relevant non-
evaluative, lower-level properties such as being a sequence of sounds, being an 
utterance, being used to refer to another person and to express and to implicate 
certain meanings, and so forth.15  
                                                        
15 The relation between value properties and those lower-order properties is often 
held to be one of strong supervenience: necessarily, if x has a specific value 
property, then there is some (usually quite complex and perhaps disjunctive) lower-
order non-evaluative property that x has and, necessarily, if anything has that non-
 17 
  It seems clear that if a remark is to appear to me to be malicious then at least 
some of those subtending properties need also to be consciously present to me, or 
represented by me, since otherwise I couldn’t identify the particular item I take to be 
malicious. The objection turns on the fact that this need not be the case in 
uncontroversial cases of perception such as sense perception. When I perceive a disk 
in front of me to be chrome-coloured I don’t need to be aware of any lower-level 
properties subtending the phenomenal colour even if there are such properties.  
The question is whether that tells against the perceptual analogy. A quick 
reply on behalf of the Scheler-Sartre view would be that there are many manifestly 
supervenient properties that plausibly figure in the content of perceptual 
experience. Something can strike me in visual experience as a chestnut tree, or as a 
TV screen. A tune can strike me in auditory experience as tonal or as dissonant. In 
order for these things to appear in those ways I need to be aware of at least some 
relevant subtending properties, such as shapes or chord successions. But this does 
not by itself impugn the claim that I can perceptually experience the higher-order 
properties. The problem for the Scheler-Sartre view, though, is that in these cases 
there aren’t different putative types of perception involved: I can visually perceive 
both the shapes and the higher-order properties, and I can hear both the pitched 
sounds and their unresolved dissonance. In the emotion case this is not so. I need to 
hear the remark, but the value property of maliciousness is supposed to be 
perceived affectively. Affective perception, if there is such a thing, would be a 
dependent sort of perception in the sense that it would constitutively depend on 
other perceptual modalities. 
This fact only counts as an objection to the perceptual account if there is 
reason to think that there is something inherently problematic about the idea of 
dependent perception in this sense. This is by no means obvious and would need to 
be independently argued for. Absent such an argument the supporter of the Scheler-
Sartre view may adopt an ‘innocence by association’ strategy, pointing to other, non-
                                                                                                                                                              
evaluative property, then it also has the evaluative property. The advocate of the 
Scheler-Sartre view can remain neutral on whether that is the best way to 
characterize the relation between values and the lower-level properties in all cases, 
and (if it is) on the best interpretation of the second necessity operator. 
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affective modes of apparently direct experience that are similarly dependent. When 
I hear the person next to me utter the string of sounds ‘It’s raining outside’, then I 
will normally experience this vocal sequence as having a certain specific meaning. I 
will have what is sometimes called an experience of meaning (which is of course not 
sufficient for actually having understood that meaning). Whatever that experience is, 
it is not identical with my sensory perception of the sounds, but it is dependent on 
that auditory perception. It seems to us in such cases that we directly and 
experientially ‘grasp’ semantic properties, yet that grasp is dependent on accessing 
various lower-level properties by way of a different experiential modality, viz. by 
hearing the sounds.   
Or consider the Husserlian claim that there can be a perception of standard 
perceptible properties as properties, i.e. as items that are multiply exemplifiable. In 
the Husserlian picture, this is a ‘founded’ mode of perception and it is dependent on 
having exemplifying items presented in sensory or quasi-sensory (e.g. imagistic) 
experience. If there is a perception of properties as such, it cannot be identical with 
the sensory relation on which it is founded because that sensory relation on its own 
only provides access to a particular. So it would be a dependent mode of perception 
in the sense at issue. 
None of these examples are uncontroversial. What they do show is that it 
can’t simply be taken for granted that there cannot be a direct experiential access to 
contents that is modally dependent or ‘founded’ in the ways illustrated by the 
examples. The burden of argument to show that there can’t be is on the opponents 
of the affective perception thesis.  
 
 
4. Different rationalizing properties? 
 
Critics of the perceptual model often point to putative differences in the epistemic 
roles of emotions and sense perceptions. They argue that there obtain quite 
different rationalizing relations between emotional experiences and evaluative 
beliefs on the one hand, and between sense perceptual experiences and ordinary 
perceptual beliefs on the other. There clearly are such differences between the 
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rationalizing properties of some emotions and uncontroversial cases of perceptual 
experience. But what would be needed to undermine the Scheler-Sartre view would 
be an argument that shows that no emotions can have the sorts of rationalizing 
properties that sense perceptions have. It is not clear that the arguments that figure 
most prominently in the current debate establish this. 
There are many different theories on the justifying role of perceptual 
experience. The general sort of approach favoured by classical phenomenologists 
was that perceptual experiences can in the right circumstances immediately justify 
corresponding perceptual judgements. For example, my perceptual experience as of 
wet ground under my feet can immediately justify the judgement that the ground 
here is wet. To say that it can immediately justify this judgement is to say that when 
giving reasons for the judgement I do not need to appeal to other beliefs – such as 
beliefs about putative causal relations between my experience and some worldly 
state or event, or beliefs about my visual system being in good order. If the relevant 
portion of the world is as it appears to be in my perceptual experience, and there is 
no reason to think that my cognitive system is malfunctioning, then simply appealing 
to what my experience appears to disclose will suffice for justification of my 
judgement that the ground here is wet. It is difficult to see how perceptual 
experience should be capable of immediately justifying perceptual judgements in 
this way unless, in the case where the experience is veridical, the object and the 
features that it is judged to have are themselves present or manifest in the 
experience itself, such that they contribute to the experience’s identity. This is the 
picture of perception that we find in Husserl. Husserl characterizes perception 
proper as the direct self-presence (Selbstgegebenheit in propria persona) of the 
perceived object and its perceived properties in the perceptual experience.16 On this 
point Scheler and Sartre adopt Husserl’s position in full. 
If this general approach is broadly right, it explains why it is appropriate in 
favourable circumstances to answer the question ‘why do you think that the ground 
is wet?’ by responding ‘I see it’. What I appeal to in justification here is the fact that 
                                                        
16 So for Husserl it is a substantive question – which he answers in the 
affirmative – whether ordinary ‘sense perception’ of independent spatial objects 
is genuine perception. 
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the ground is wet, or, on some views, some other suitable worldly item such as the 
ground’s wetness, which is itself present and manifest in my perceptual experience if 
it is a case of successful, i.e. genuine, sense perception.  
The Scheler-Sartre view has it that there are some emotional experiences 
that can similarly count as direct disclosures of evaluative facts or evaluative 
properties instantiated in the world such that the latter are present in the 
experience itself. The most promising candidates for such experiences are basic-case 
psychic emotions such as those mentioned earlier, where the target of the emotion 
(its particular object) is itself perceptually given.17 
It may be objected that even in these cases there are epistemic disanalogies 
undermining the affective perception model. First, it seems that these emotions can 
be assessed for rationality in a way that perceptual experiences cannot (Brady 2011: 
139; Deonna and Teroni 2012: 69). Even when a subject is suffering from sense-
perceptual illusion, it makes no sense to ask ‘why are you having that experience?’ if 
the why-question is understood in a normative sense. But such normative why-
questions always seem to make sense with respect to intentional emotions. When 
someone feels overwhelmed by a natural scenery I can meaningfully ask ‘Why are 
you feeling that way? What’s so grand about that?’  
Second, normally reports of sense-perceptual experience can silence the 
demand for further reasons for belief. When you respond to my question ‘why do 
you believe that the ground is wet?’ by appealing to your perceptual experience of 
it, that can settle the matter. By contrast, it is very rarely if ever sufficient to answer 
the normative question ‘why do you believe that his state is pitiable?’ by responding 
‘because I feel it’ (cf. Brady 2013: 86-90).  
Third, it has been argued that not only can emotions not supply sufficient 
reasons for evaluative belief, they cannot provide any justifying reasons at all. This is 
because for an emotion to be justified it needs to be an appropriate response to the 
                                                        
17 Since these emotions on the Scheler-Sartre view also have causal content – the 
affective state is experienced as motivated by the object (Scheler 1980/1973: 
253/246-7; Sartre 2004b: 19) – this entails that cause and effect here violate the 
Humean injunction that they should be logically ‘distinct existences’. According 
to the classical phenomenologists, intentional phenomena quite generally violate 
the Humean requirement (see e.g. Stein 1980: 56f.). 
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target state of affairs. But if an emotional experience itself could provide reasons or 
evidence for judging that state of affairs to involve some value or other, then the 
mere occurrence of the emotion would supply reasons for thinking that that 
emotion is appropriate. It would thus provide some justification (albeit not 
conclusive justification) for itself. But it is implausible to think that emotions can be 
normatively self-supporting in this way, providing reasons to believe that they are 
appropriate. (Brady 2010: 123; 2011: 144-5).  
 
The Scheler-Sartre view has resources to defuse these worries. 
The key to its response to the first objection is that the value properties that figure in 
the content of emotions are higher-order properties, usually dependent on quite 
complex combinations of lower-level properties. We often ask normative why-
questions about emotions, even the basic-case psychic emotions Scheler has 
centrally in mind, because we are in doubt whether some of the relevant lower-level 
properties really are instantiated in this instance and, therefore, whether the 
experience is veridical. But there is no significant disanalogy here with higher-order 
properties figuring in sense-perceptual experience with a similarly complex base. 
When somebody claims, on the basis of his auditory experience, that a certain 
musical phrase is incomplete or ‘unresolved’, or that a certain chord is dissonant, we 
can also entertain such doubts and quite properly ask why he hears it that way. And 
when someone claims to see a smile on her interlocutor’s face as a ‘false smile’ we 
can similarly ask for reasons.  
These considerations also partly explain the second difference pointed out by 
Brady. We are normally not satisfied when, in reply to our question ‘why do you 
believe his remark was malicious?’, we receive the answer ‘because I could feel it’. 
But nor does the response ‘I could see it’ settle the matter when we ask for 
somebody’s reasons for judging that a smile he perceived was a false smile. Still, the 
objection does point to a genuine difference. In the sense-perceptual case the 
default scenario is that our sensory systems are working properly and, given suitable 
attention, fairly reliably reveal much of the perceptible layout of our environment. 
This can hardly be said for our affective systems. On the Scheler-Sartre view, the 
relevant affective receptivity is not the standard case and appeal to emotional 
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experience when grounding evaluative judgement is therefore widely, and rightly, 
treated with caution. 18  
As for Brady’s third point, if we accept his neo-sentimentalist premise that to 
judge that X is valuable is at least in part to judge that certain sentiments are 
appropriate with respect to X; and if we also assume (with the Scheler-Sartre view) 
that among these sentiments are emotions and that these can in favourable 
circumstances supply reasons for the judgement that X is valuable, does it follow 
that the mere occurrence of an emotion provides a reason for believing that that 
very emotion is appropriate? 
In the basic case scenario of the ‘psychic’ emotions under consideration, the 
emotion’s appropriateness on the Scheler-Sartre view is a matter of its providing 
access to evaluative features of its target. If the emotion is appropriate, these 
features are disclosed – they are self-present in the emotional experience. As such, 
they are presented as pro tanto meriting to be actual (or not to be actual, in the case 
of disvalues). Their presence explains the affective valence of the emotion and, 
provided the subject has suitable background beliefs, also its motivational aspect. So 
what justifies the corresponding evaluative judgement, on this picture, is the 
evaluative state of affairs itself, which is immediately present to the subject in the 
emotional experience.  
It does not follow that whenever I have an emotional experience that seems 
to me to directly disclose some such evaluative state of affairs that it does in fact do 
so. The emotion may therefore seem to me to be appropriate (i.e. value-revealing) 
without being so. It may be, and no doubt often is, an affective illusion. The 
perceptualist can insist that, if it is an affective illusion, not only does it not give me a 
conclusive reason to make the corresponding value judgement, it does not give me 
any reason at all. So it is not the case that all emotions construed on the perceptual 
model would (implausibly) emerge as self-justifying. 
 
5. Experiencing values in objects: the very idea 
  
                                                        
18 Similar points are made by Pelser (2014: 120-1). 
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One question that has received relatively little treatment in the recent debates 
around the perceptual model is: what would it be for value properties to be 
instantiated in objects (or events, or other persons) such that they might be 
affectively perceivable as evaluative properties had by those objects (etc)? Since an 
answer to this question is obviously crucial if the perceptual model is to get off the 
ground, the relative silence on this is surprising. The classical expositions in Scheler 
and Sartre do have something to say on it, but their views here remain somewhat 
gestural and elusive. Let me conclude with some remarks on the direction that a 
reconstruction of these views should take. 
A positive value property is a property that is inherently such as pro tanto to 
merit – to make a justified ‘demand’ – to be or to remain realized. It is not a novel 
point to note that such properties are metaphysically distinctly odd. How could any 
property be such as to make demands? To make sense of this, it helps to recall what 
the target objects of Scheler’s psychic emotions typically are: 
 
I am indignant about a malicious remark about another person that I overhear. 
I admire the justice of an action I witness. 
I feel pity for a person in severe mental distress. 
 
In all these cases, the target object itself is or includes a conscious mental state. 
Now, it is relatively uncontroversial that conscious mental states can be intrinsically 
valuable. For classical utilitarians, experiences of pleasure instantiate intrinsic value 
(though one might add that this depends on what the pleasure is about). For 
Kantians, the good will qua conscious mental act in which a person determines 
herself on the basis of the categorical imperative is intrinsically valuable. If this 
intrinsic positive value is itself experienced by the subject, then, given the 
characterization of value properties canvassed, these mental states would have to 
be experienced by the subject as meriting to remain actualized. The pleasure, 
experienced as positively valuable, would have to be experienced as a pleasure that 
ought to go on, the Kantian good will would similarly have to experienced by the 
subject as ‘making a demand on the future’ (Sartre 2004b: 23; Scheler 1980/1973: 
108-9/90-92): as making a justified demand on the subject to continue to be 
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motivated by the categorical imperative. And this seems phenomenologically apt. In 
so far as one experiences one’s state of pleasure as positively valuable one 
experiences it as something that ought to go on, as meriting continuation, and the 
same goes for experiencing one’s being motivated by the categorical imperative as a 
good thing.  
On the Scheler-Sartre view, this experience necessarily has an attitudinal 
dimension, but this should not be thought of as typically involving a reflective 
emotion directed at the experience (being pleased about one’s pleasure; admiring 
one’s own good will). Rather, the relevant ‘felt approval’ usually remains at the 
unreflective level and then is perhaps best described as a contented acquiescence in 
the mental state, normally motivating an inclination to remain in it. But the affective 
awareness of the value of the mental state can become a reflective emotion, 
typically when the state has ceased while its value is still experientially given in 
memory; the appropriate reflective emotion then is one of regret (in the pleasure 
example) or guilt (in the Kantian example).19 
Conscious mental states, then, are frequently experienced as having value by 
their subjects and it’s plausible to say that they sometimes actually are valuable. 
Now, Scheler’s psychic emotions are often, as in the examples above, directed at 
intentional objects that are or include conscious mental states of others. This 
                                                        
19 It is worth stressing just how many episodic emotions have targets that are no 
longer actually present while the emotion is felt. Think of the anger you feel at an 
insulting remark made by someone a few seconds ago. On the Scheler-Sartre 
view, these emotions, if full-blown (see below), need to be understood as 
involving an experiential representation of the relevant value properties in 
imagistic or simulating memory (cf. Sartre 2004a: 68f.). One problem here is 
that, on the view proposed, an experiential access to the evaluative aspect of the 
target requires the affective attitudes Scheler calls ‘attraction’ or ‘repulsion’ 
(unless the target is evaluatively neutral). The supporter of the view therefore 
needs to give an account of what it would be to have that evaluative aspect 
present in imagistic or simulating memory without the attitude being merely 
simulated or imagined. Obviously, when feeling anger about a remark just past, I 
do not merely simulate or imagine my felt disapproval of it. One might add that 
emotional responses in this type of situation are often reflex or truncated affects 
involving no explicit evaluative component. Such truncated affects are often best 
understood as arousals and action inclinations triggered by perceptual stimuli in 
conjunction with dispositions generated by previous evaluations of objects 
(events, etc.) of the relevant type (cf. Lyons 1980: 85-9). 
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commits the Scheler-Sartre view to the thesis that, in the basic and ‘successful’ case 
of this sort of emotional experience, the value properties of other people’s mental 
states are affectively perceived through these emotions directed at them: I perceive 
the specific value of another’s just decision in admiration, or the disvalue of his 
malice in indignation, or the disvalue of his distress in pity. This requires, on the 
account given earlier, that relevant lower-order properties of their mental states are 
also directly present – perceptually disclosed – to me from a third-personal 
perspective. 
The idea that mental states of others can be perceived in this way is a core 
claim of classical phenomenology. It was first articulated by Husserl and then refined 
by Stein and Scheler.20 In the latter versions, the claim is that, in some contexts, 
conscious mental states of other people are perceptually accessible in perceiving 
their expressive behaviour: 
 
[I]t seems to us that we are directly acquainted with [haben] another 
person’s joy in his smile, with his sorrow and pain in his tears, with his shame 
in his blushing …. If anyone tells me that this is not ‘perception’, for it 
‘cannot’ be so … I would beg him … to compare these examples with cases in 
which there is in fact what he … tends to suppose here too, namely a 
demonstrable inference. … For example, … where … I am compelled to 
assume a discrepancy between experience and expression for ‘reasons’ that 
are themselves due (in the last resort) to perception. (Scheler 2009: 260; 
trans. modified) 
 
Unfortunately this argument doesn’t give Scheler what he needs. A belief may be 
phenomenologically immediate (non-inferential) without being epistemically 
immediate. What is needed to show that beliefs about another’s mental states can 
be both immediately and rationally grounded in the content of perceptual 
experience is the idea that the other’s mental state in such cases is not, or not 
always, a ‘distinct existence’ from his directly given expressive behaviour and merely 
                                                        
20 Husserl (1977: 89f.); Stein (1980: 85-97); Scheler (2009: 259-64). 
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contingently linked with it. Otherwise my perceptual experience of the other’s 
behaviour would not give me direct perceptual access to that mental state. The 
claim has to be that the other’s expressive behaviour is at least sometimes part of 
his relevant mental state, such that that mental state is itself, in the right 
circumstances, perceptually given to me in my perceptual access to the other’s 
expressive behaviour. This is the position defended explicitly by Edith Stein in On the 
Problem of Empathy (1917): 
 
The facial expression is the external aspect of the grief, both form a natural 
unity … fear is one thing with the cry of fear, just as the grief is with its facial 
expression, and it differs in its [third-personal perceptual] givenness from 
that of a coach that is indicated to me [the perceiver] through the rumbling 
of its wheels, just as the [perceptual] presentation of grief through its facial 
expression differs from that of a fire indicated by smoke. (Stein 1980: 87, 89). 
 
Even if one were to grant this, it still does not seem enough to get the Scheler-Sartre 
view off the hook. For on the present account we are assuming that the evaluative 
features of another’s mental state that I affectively perceive in indignation, 
admiration or pity belong to the experiential dimension of that mental state – they 
belong to what it is like for the other to be in that state. But surely, it may be said, 
what it is like for the other to be in pain cannot be directly given to me in my 
perception of his pain behaviour, even if that behaviour is part of the other’s token 
mental state that is his pain. For the Scheler-Sartre view to go through it needs to 
deny this. The advocate of the view has to say that the experienced first-personal 
dimension of the other’s distress, or of his just decision, or of his malice, can be part 
of the content of my perceptual experience of its behavioural expression.  
A possible line to make good on this claim is suggested by Husserl’s account 
of what he (misleadingly) calls ‘empathy’. This starts from the familiar thesis that 
there is more to the phenomenal content of one’s perceptual experience than what 
one is currently sensorily related to. When I look at the front façade of a house this 
will normally appear to me as such in my perceptual experience. What I experience 
will strike me experientially as the front of a house rather than as just a two-
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dimensional surface, although no light waves reflected from the back wall of the 
house currently impact on my visual systems. Yet it will appear to me as having a 
back wall and, arguably, also as being independent of my experience of it. Nor is this 
typically a matter of judgement upon the content of the experience. The content can 
continue to appear to me that way even if, for some reason, I come to judge that my 
experience is not veridical. Husserl calls those components of the experiential 
content to which am not currently sensorily related horizonal (or ‘appresented’) 
components of the content. He argues that a similar account can be given of some 
situations in which we seem to encounter the subjectivity of another in their 
expressive behaviour. We experience that behaviour as having a subjective 
dimension, a what-it-is-likeness for the other that belongs to it in (very roughly) the 
way in which the back of the house belongs to its façade. In this manner it could be 
argued that the evaluative properties had, for example, by another’s experience of 
pain can be part of the horizonal content of my perception of his expressive pain 
behaviour.  
 
If this sort of story can be made good, it might give the Scheler-Sartre view what it 
needs to motivate its claim that evaluative properties can in some contexts be 
affectively perceived. Some ‘psychic’ emotions may come out, on this construal, as 
perceptual experiences, third-personally appresenting value properties of others’ 
mental states.21 Clearly more would need to be said in development and defence of 
this account. What I have offered here are some initial suggestions on the direction 
such a defence might take. 
                                                        
21 What about ‘psychic’ emotions whose targets, on most views, do not include 
mental states, such as being moved by the grandeur of a natural scenery? Here 
Sartre and Scheler part ways. For Sartre, such emotions, if they presented their 
objects as having entirely mind-independent value properties, would be non-
veridical, since he takes value to be existentially dependent on consciousness 
(Sartre 2003: 62). Scheler, by contrast, seems to countenance the existence of 
such value properties. Given his account of value, this may well seem mysterious, 
although he might argue that it is at any rate no more mysterious than the mind-
independent existence of deontic reasons or normative facts/properties 
regarded as indispensible in some meta-ethical approaches. However, regarding 
emotions about natural objects he seems to take the view that they often present 
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